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NOTES AND COMMENT
been in any way interested, they could not obtain an impartial trial
before a jury composed exclusively of whites. The Supreme Court
in denying their petition held that the statute was intended to protect
against state action and against that alone, and that it was not intended
as a corrective of errors or wrongs committed by judicial tribunals in
the administration of the law at the trial. This decision has resulted
in a circuity of litigation for after a conviction has been affirmed by
the highest state court it may be brought to the Supreme Court on
the ground that there has been a denial of the equal protection of the
law as required by the Fourteenth Amendment. This occurred in
one of the Scottsboro cases. 17 If a removal to a federal court would
have been allowed at the commencement of the action, upon the de-
fendant showing the existence of local prejudice a final adjudication
would have been sooner made.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual from judicial
or administrative as well as legislative action. In Moore v. Dempsey' 8
the Supreme Court held a "mob-dominated trial" to be void. In
Smith v. Texas 19 wherein the wording of the state statute relative
to the drawing of grand jurors did not envisage racial discrimination
in the drawing of grand jurors, but whereas in actual practice there
was discrimination against Negroes, the conviction was reversed.
Thus in both these cases which are representative of a marked trend,
which has been most recently manifested in the Ashcraft decision, 20
we find that the Supreme Court has peered behind the faqade of state
criminal procedure and reversed convictions which were based on the
shortcomings of the judicial and administrative arms of the state. It
would seem that these decisions call for a re-analysis of Virginia v.
Rives 21 and the cases predicated thereon. The narrow construction
'which the courts have put upon the removal statute has been criti-
cized. 22 It is indeed so restrictive that no accused has ever been able
to have his case removed from the state to the federal court and tried
in the latter. Congress did not intend this to be the result of its
enactment of the statute. It is submitted that it should be restored to
its original purpose and a right of removal allowed on the ground of
local prejudice.
THEODORE KRIEGER.
STARE DECIsis, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AD THE
NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
The present justices of the United States Supreme Court are
now engaged in an acerbitous struggle in hopeless disagreement over
17 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 79 L. Ed. 1074 (1935).
is 261 U. S. 86, 67 L. Ed. 543 (1923).
193 11 U. S. 128, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940).20 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 88 L. Ed. 845 (1944).
22 Cited supra note 13.
22 Note (1941) 54 HARV. L. REV. 685.
1944 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the most basic and cherished of all our conceptions of law-the valid-
ity of the doctrine of stare decisis. On the one hand it is contended
that the Supreme Court is not bound by precedent. On the other it
is contended that its denial is the denial of the very existence of all
law. This disagreement is not extrajudicial; the bases of decisions
deliberately expound these divergencies. One Justice has sneered at
its hoary respectability and called it anemic.' Another Justice has
flatly declared the right of the Supreme Court to change its mind in
violation of precedent whenever it saw fit to do so.2  Another Justice
contended that there can be no law that ignores it, since precedent is
the foundation of all natural and common law.8
What is the meaning of this struggle? Is it merely the individ-
ualistic expression of ordinary difference of opinion under the rules,
or, is it an all-out repudiation of fundamental rules of law projected
for the benefit of labor alone, but encompassing in its sweep the de-
struction of all rules? The American Bar Association, through its
House of Delegates, unanimously proposed a bill in protest of the
prevailing conditions, which bill might curb the power of administra-
tive bureaus and provide for a judicial review of administrative rul-
ings 4 contrary to decisions abdicating the judicial function in labor
questions.
The National Labor Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act were passed not only in derogation of common law rights having
their origin in natural law that had existed for centuries, but in direct
conflict with the constitutional guaranties of those rights as well as
with prior decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which
had reaffirmed those guaranties. These Acts were so revolutionary
that immediately their constitutionality was challenged under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. In rational-
izing their implications, we are met at the threshold with questioning
of fundamental definitions.
In considering the right of property and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which was designed to prevent its deprivation without due
process of law, the first question that presents itself is, what is prop-
erty? Is the right to be free from interference by such picketing as
is destructive of a man's business a right of property which can be
denied him by statute and judicial construction in violation of consti-
tutional guaranties and prior decisions? The Federal Supreme Court
has not ventured to say that such a right is not a right of property;
it has destroyed the right by judicial interpretation of these Acts,
See Mr. Justice Holmes in "Decisional Law and Stare Decisis", A. R
A. J., June, 1944.
2 Smith v. Allwright, 319 U. S. 738, 63 Sup. Ct. 1325 (1943).
3 See Mr. Justice Roberts' dissent in Smith v. Allwright, ci I srit;
note 2. See also Mr. Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion in Mahnich - ,th -ei
S. S. Co., 320 U. S. 725, 64 Sup. Ct. 455 (1944). See also "Impro Jddiial
Administration" by Roscoe Pound, A. B. A. J., December, 1942.
4 "House of Delegates Offers a Bill," A. B. A. J., April, F 181.
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holding that the right of labor to picket is based upon the natural and
common law and constitutional right of free speech, and that when
one right conflicts with another, the paramount right must prevail
even though it destroys the subordinate right.5 Which is paramount
and which is subordinate raises a secondary question. We concede
the right of free speech embodied in the Constitution and having its
origin in natural and common law. The simple question then pre-
sents itself, is picketing a right of free speech when its only purpose
and effect is to destroy the right of property? The Supreme Court
has answered the question in the affirmative, from which there is no
appeal except to reason.6 If that decision be contrary to natural law
and reason, so fused into the common law, as well as to an existing
constitutional right in affirmation of the common law, how do we
justify its existence? The Constitution does not say one right pro-
tected by it may be destroyed by another created by statute and
affirmed by judicial construction violative of its previous decisions,
even though the second right be also a constitutional right. Such a
system would end in chaos.7 Whence, then, comes the power of the
legislature and of the Supreme Court to override the Constitution,
the one by statute and the other by invoking a theory of construction?
Is the Constitution what the Judges say it is, or is it self-sustaining?
Should we hold with one Judge who said that law is the will of the
Judges, or should we hold with his colleague who said, "By no means;
it is the rule of right"? 8
Is this a clash between sovereign fiat and sovereign fiat (one
constitutional guarantie arrayed against another), or does it present
the antinomy of reason and fiat (between common law and statute) ?
If the rule of reason is the basis for all law, there can be no conflict,
for opposing laws, one in consonance with right and the other in
violation of right, cannot exist in reason. 9
Stare decisis is not a rule of law, it is a rule for the ascertain-
ment of law; decisions can have the force of law only if they expound
the law truly. Not every decision, therefore, can compel blind ad-
herence to its pronouncements. "Reason is the life of the law; nay,
the common law itself is nothing else but reason," said Coke. Black-
stone also declared that precedent must be observed "to keep the scale
of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new
judge's opinion." Yet neither Coke nor Blackstone had originated
this thought. It was Marcus Tullius Cicero who put the thought in
immortal words when he commented upon the incorporation of Jus
Naturalis into the Roman laws. That same feeling then was reiter-
5 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (1940).
8 Thornhill v. Alabama, cited supra note 5.
7 Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908); Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (U. S. 1824); Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 47 L. Ed.
492 (1903).
8 Langbridge's Case, Y. B. 19 Ed. 3, 375 (1345).
9 Prof. Lon L. Fuller (Harvard), "Reason and Fiat in Case Laws" (1943).
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ated by Professor Beale, who stated: "It must be obvious that neither
by legislative nor judicial legislation can the basic system of law be
changed." 10
What, then, are the substantive rights founded in natural law or
common law or statute which have been destroyed by these new stat-
utes and their construction? Was the change justified by reason and
due to the demand for change in fundamental concepts of right?
Chief Justice Marshall, in Ogden v. Saunders 11 had under considera-
tion Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution: "No state . . . shall
pass any... law impairing the obligation of contracts." His analysis
of the property right and its incident, the right of contract, is the most
profound and illuminating to be found in the books. These, he views
as rights independent of, and superior to, recognition and affirmation
by man-made law. The property right is a right founded in natural
law which governments may not destroy either by unreasonable con-
ditions to its creation, or by failure to provide coercive aids to its
enforcement.
Until the enactment of the statutes under consideration and
until their construction by the United States Supreme Court, those
principles had never been questioned. Down to 1932 the history of
labor is a history of enlightened progress. The Clayton Act of 1914
had been limited in its application by judicial construction to bona
fide labor disputes.12  From 1932 on, however, conflicting decisional
law construing the new statutes has thrown the status of labor into
utter confusion, permitted the destruction of private property without
due process, and denied the right of the employer to freely contract
for labor.
The avowed purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 13 was to out-
law any contract made by an employer with his employee which made
it a condition of employment that the employee promise not to join
or remain a member of any labor organization, or that the employee
withdraw from an employment relation in the event that he joins or
remains a member of any labor organization. It was designed to
override the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
Adair case 14 which had declared a similar statute unconstitutional, as
a law impairing the obligation of contracts and as a deprivation of
property without due process of law. The direct effect of the Act
was to force the infiltration of industry with union labor through the
open shop. Once labor gained a foothold, however weak, the union
was permitted to make any demand upon the employer, whether or
10 Prof. Beale (Harvard), "Conflict of Laws," The Causes of Change hn
the Unwritten Law, § 4.7, p. 39 (1935).
11 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827).
12 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S.
184, 42 Sup. Ct. 72 (1921); Duplex Printing Co. v. Decring, 254 U. S. 443,
41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921).
1347 STAT. §70, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 101-115 (1932).
14 Adair v. United States, cited spra note 7.
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not there was a controversy between the employer and his employees
or any relations between the union and the employer or employees,
and to coerce the employer to submit to an unwilling contract in the
absence of union representation, or suffer the destruction of his prop-
erty by strike, picketing and boycott. Even where there were no
union employees, the courts have justified union demands as consti-
tuting a labor dispute, and the courts in upholding the constitutional-
ity of the Act, have rationalized the strike weapon where there was no
labor controversy as freedom of action and the right to work or not
to work, while picketing was justified as the right of free speech
which does not depend upon a labor dispute for its exercise even
though its only purpose is one of coercion through the destruction of
property.15
The remedy of injunction by exclusory conditions was denied to
the employer for union abuses through the use of these weapons,
except in the case of threatened continuing violence; even there the
remedy was rarely granted. Where there existed threats of contin-
ued violence, the remedy of injunction was denied if the employer
refused to arbitrate demands made upon him by a union having no
right of representation, and where there existed no controversy be-
tween the employer and his employees. The courts have generally
upheld these provisions upon the theory of the existence of a labor
dispute by the bare assertion of a union demand without representa-
tion and without controversy because the Act arbitrarily defines a
labor dispute as any demand made by a union upon an employer
where no controversy exists. The Act does use the words "collec-
tive bargaining", but it could not in reason be said that these methods,
in the absence of a controversy and in the absence of representation,
spell collective bargaining growing out of a labor dispute.16
The Act was limited in its operation to the courts of the United
States, and the states were not therefore precluded from assumingjurisdiction in labor cases. The confusion created by the refusal of
the states to follow the extreme implications of the Act led to the
adoption of the National Labor Relations Act 17 which was designed
as an instrumentality to grant affirmative remedy to labor's demands
and to make more effective the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. The reason advanced for its enactment, that it was in further-
ance of the regulation of commerce, was the same reason advanced
for the enactment of the law that the Adair case declared unconstitu-
tional, despite a declaration in the Adair case that the question of
union or non-union labor had nothing to do with commerce. A Su-
15 Thornhill v. Alabama, cited supra notes 5, 6.
16 Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers Union No. 31238,
308 U. S. 522, 60 Sup. Ct. 292 (1939) ; Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union,
301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857 (1937); American Furniture Co. v. Local 200,
222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250 (1936); Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin,
71 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d), 293 U. S. 595, 55 Sup. Ct. 110 (1934).
1749 STAT. §§ 449-457, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-165 (1935).
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preme Court in sympathy with the political philosophy of the moment
then declared the law constitutional and overruled all earlier decisions
to the contrary, but the decisions in order to give full force to the Act
did not stop at that; they preempted the states or jurisdiction in labor
matters by injecting constitutional questions,' 8 and by extending the
power of Congress under the commerce clause to almost all commerce
of an intrastate nature having even a remote influence on interstate
conmnerce3 9 Can a "declared policy" override natural rights and
constitutional guaranties? The Supreme Court has said it can.
While the Norris-LaGuardia Act immunized labor against co-
ercion and abuse committed by labor in the absence of any relations
with the employer or his employees under the theory that any demand
by labor is a labor dispute, the courts could not compel the employer
to accede to its demands, it could only deny the employer a remedy.
The Labor Act was then passed to effectuate the coercive purpose of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act by enforcing labor's demands when labor
had through such immunity obtained a majority representation. And
the coercive power of the Labor Act under the pseudonym of "collec-
tive bargaining" is shown in a long line of decisions of the Labor
Board declaring it an unfair labor practice for the employer to refuse
to bargain with representation procured through these methods. Even
the failure to then agree has been construed to be an unfair labor
practice. 20  The Supreme Court has in general upheld the Labor
Board and, abdicating its judicial function, has held that it lackedjurisdiction to review an administrative board's findings of fact.2 1
Two cases clearly demonstrate that prevention of disturbance of
interstate commerce as the reason advanced for the seizing of national
legislative control over the activities of labor for their benefit in what
had theretofore been the jurisdiction of the states over torts, was not
the real reason for the enactment.22  The Clayton Act, the National
Labor Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act were deliberately
designed to protect and exclude labor alone from the consequence of
all conduct obstructing the "free flow" of commerce. These Acts
were not intended to act both ways; they were expressly passed in
the interest of labor alone. The Hutcheson case so holds. The
Thornhill case held that picketing is a right of free speech and is not
18 Thornhill v. Alabama, cited supra notes 5, 6, 14.
19 J. L. Brandeis & Sons v. National Labor Relations Board, 142 F. (2d)
977 (C. C. A. 8th, 1944); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 63 Sup. Ct. 82(1942); Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U. S. 88, 63 Sup. Ct. 125(1942) ; Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S.
197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206 (1938).
20 H. J. Heinz Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U. S. 514, 61
Sup. Ct. 320 (1941).
21 National Labor Relations Board v. Waterman S. S. Co.. 309 U. S. 206.
60 Sup. Ct. 493 (1940); National Labor Relations Board v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 308 U. S. 413, 60 Sup. Ct. 306 (1940).
22 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 Sup. Ct. 463 (1941)
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader et al., 310 U. S. 469, 60 Sup. Ct. 982 (1940).
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dependent on a labor dispute for its exercise,23 even though its only
effect is to destroy property. The Swing case reaffirmed that doc-
trine, 24 and by its sweeping pronouncements, the decision in the Swuing
case intruded upon and virtually transformed the common law of the
several states. By injecting the constitutional question of free speech
it preempted the states of their jurisdiction over the common law
tort. The Senn case so stated, 25 but the states refused to fall in line
and injunctions issued despite the Swing and Senn decisions where
there existed no labor controversy. The Ritter case seemed to have
indicated a reversal or modification of the conclusiveness of the prior
decisions, 27 but the Supreme Court in November, 1943,28 reaffirmed
its earlier decisions in the Senn and Swing cases when it overruled
the New York Court of Appeals' decision that picketing was unlaw-
ful in the absence of a labor dispute.
The basic nature of the controversy leaves no room for compro-
mise, and the diverse opinions are intense, obdurate and implacable.2 9
Are these extreme decisions merely the temporary swing of the
pendulum from right to left, the general ebb and flow of judicial
opinion, or are they an attempt to make permanent the ephemeral
political philosophy of a transient political administration by repudiat-
ing the fundamental law? Time alone will tell. But this is true:
We cannot build a new order of stare decisis upon the ruins of a
principle which we have repudiated merely by piling up mountains of
decisions, Pelion on Olympus and Ossa on Pelion, through the very
confusion which the statutes and decisions themselves have created.
Louis GRANAT.
23 Thornhill v. Alabama, cited supra notes 5, 6, 14, 16.
24A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568 (1941).
25 Senn v. Tile Layers Union, cited supra note 15.
26 Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 314 U. S. 615, 62 Sup. Ct. 96 (1941);
J. H. & S. Theatre v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932); Nann v.
Rainmist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931).
27 Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's
Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 62 Sup. Ct. 807 (1942).
28 Cafeteria Employees Union etc. v. Angelos et aL., and Same v. Tsakires,
320 U. S. 293, 64 Sup. Ct. 126 (1943).
29 Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., cited supra note 3.
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